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We report an outbreak of invasive pneumococcal dis-
ease and pneumococcal pneumonia among shipyard 
workers, in Turku, Southwest Finland. In total, 31 con-
firmed and six probable cases were identified between 
3 May and 28 November 2019. Streptococcus pneumo-
niae  serotypes 12F, 4 and 8 were isolated from blood 
cultures of 25 cases. Occupational hygiene measures 
and vaccination of ca 4,000 workers are underway to 
control the outbreak at the shipyard.
In early October 2019, Turku University Hospital (TYKS) 
observed several cases of invasive pneumococcal 
disease (IPD) among shipyard workers. On 3 October, 
TYKS alerted the Finnish Institute for Health and 
Welfare (THL) about seven Streptococcus pneumoniae-
positive blood cultures among pneumonia patients 
with a link to a shipyard in Turku. Here we describe the 
undertaken investigations and control measures of the 
outbreak.
Description of the outbreak
Of the initial cluster, the first case was admitted to 
TYKS on 29 August and the last on 3 October. THL had 
received four  S. pneumoniae  (pneumococcus) blood-
culture isolates before the original alert, and serotyped 
these on 4 October (serotype 4 isolates (n = 3) and 
serotype 12F isolate (n = 1)).
After confirming an increase in IPD cases among men, 
between 18 and 67 years of age, in Southwest Finland 
compared with National Infectious Disease Register 
(NIDR) baseline data from 2009 to 2018, THL declared 
an ongoing IPD outbreak at the shipyard. THL formed 
an outbreak control team (OCT) in collaboration 
with TYKS, the City of Turku, the Finnish Institute of 
Occupational Health and the shipyard management to 
investigate and contain the outbreak (Figure 1). 
Shipyard workforce
Nearly 7,000 workers access the shipyard area daily. 
The workforce is multinational: some are employed 
directly by the shipyard (mainly for hull building), some 
via subsidiaries and numerous subcontractors (mainly 
for final stages of ship outfitting).
Case definition
In order to allow for a broad case finding, a confirmed 
outbreak case was defined as an individual who had 
worked at the shipyard after 1 February 2019 and 
presented with a clinical diagnosis consistent with 
IPD or pneumococcal pneumonia and had  S. pneu-
moniae  isolated from blood or cerebrospinal fluid or 
pneumococcal antigen detected in urine. If there was 





We reviewed hospital records and laboratory notifi-
cations to the NIDR from TYKS since 1 February 2019 
to seek additional outbreak-related cases. As at 28 
November, 31 confirmed cases were identified; all 
except one were men, with cases having a median age 
of 48 years (range: 19–64). The cases were nationals 
of Finland (n = 13) or other European Union/European 
Economic Area (EU/EEA) (n = 16) or non-EU/EEA (n=2) 
countries. We interviewed both confirmed and prob-
able cases to describe demographics, risk factors for 
IPD, activities outside work, work tasks and onsite 
working patterns of cases 10 days before the onset of 
symptoms. THL issued a communication through the 
EU Early Warning and Response System on 9 October 
to inform and facilitate potential case finding across 
Europe. No cases connected to this outbreak were 
identified outside Finland.
As at 3 December, 30 confirmed cases had been hos-
pitalised and treated for septic pneumococcal pneu-
monia between 3 May and 3 December, and one case 
died from pneumococcal meningitis. Additionally, 
there were six probable cases, all of whom were men 
of working age and treated at a hospital within the 
same period (Figure 2). Twenty-five of the 37 confirmed 
and probable cases were interviewed (Figure 1) and 
the majority of them were current smokers (n = 19), 
mostly without underlying conditions (n = 22), working 
on the final stages of ship outfitting with no common 
activities outside work (Table). Eight confirmed and 
three probable cases were identified after the start of 
the vaccination intervention, with one confirmed case 
being vaccinated at the shipyard 2 days and another 
confirmed case vaccinated 1 month before symptom 
onset. We did not consider the former vaccinated case 
as a vaccine failure as the immune response had no 
time to develop, while the laboratory information is 
pending for the latter one. Additionally, one of three 
probable cases was also vaccinated 1 month before 
symptom onset.
Clinical information
IPD cases presented with X-ray-confirmed pneumo-
nia, with the main reasons for hospitalisation at TYKS 
being thoracic pain, respiratory failure and high fever. 
Median duration of hospitalisation was 5.5 days (range: 
1–34). Seven confirmed cases required intensive care 
for respiratory failure. Median stay in intensive care 
unit was 6 days (range: 1–26). All hospitalised patients 
rapidly responded to antimicrobial therapy and were 
discharged to home care.
Laboratory investigations and whole 
genome sequencing
Pneumococcal isolates were available for 25 con-
firmed cases. All isolates were susceptible to ben-
zylpenicillin, clindamycin, erythromycin, tetracycline 
and vancomycin according to European Committee on 
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) break-
points [1]. Serotyping by Quellung identified serotypes 
12F (n = 13), 4 (n = 11) and 8 (n = 1) (Figure 2).
All outbreak isolates will be whole genome sequenced. 
At the time of submission, seventeen isolates were ana-
lysed by whole genome sequencing to determine the 
multilocus sequence typing (MLST), core and accessory 
Figure 1
Timeline of invasive pneumococcal disease outbreak at a shipyard, Turku, Southwest Finland, May–November 2019
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confirmed interviewed case (n=21)
confirmed non-interviewed case (n=10)
probable interviewed case (n=4)




aMLST: accessory genome multilocus sequence typing; cgMLST: core genome multilocus sequence typing; EWRS: Early Warning and Response 
System; IPD: invasive pneumococcal disease; MLST: multilocus sequence typing; OCT: outbreak control team; PPV23: pneumococcal 
polysaccharide vaccine; WGS: whole genome sequencing.
Key events of ship building are marked on the top arrow. Outbreak progression in the months before the alert from Turku University Hospital 
are coloured in orange, and the months after the alert are coloured in green. Cases are depicted in a chronological order.
3www.eurosurveillance.org
genome MLST (cgMLST including 1,234 genes; aMLST 
including 708 genes) profiles. Ridom SeqSphere+ soft-
ware version 5.1.0 was used to define and analyse the 
cgMLST and aMLST. The data for this study have been 
deposited in the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA) 
at EMBL-EBI under accession number PRJEB35348 
(https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena/data/view/PRJEB35348). 
Three sequence types (STs) were observed: ST6202 
(serotype 12F, n = 9), ST801 (serotype 4, n = 7) and 
ST1480 (serotype 8, n = 1). Genomes of isolates of the 
same serotype were similar with ≤ 4 allelic differences 
within serotype 12F and ≤ 40 allelic differences within 
serotype 4 (Figure 3). Serotype 4-ST801 was identified 
in two previous shipyard outbreaks in Vestnes, Norway 
[2] and Belfast, United Kingdom [3,4]; ST801 has been 
also reported from IPD isolates in Czech Republic and 
Portugal [5,6]. ST6202 has been reported from both 
invasive and non-invasive isolates with several sero-
types from China, Russia, Belarus and Singapore [6].
Control measures
On 16 October, a decision to implement vaccination and 
promote hygiene measures to control the outbreak was 
taken. On the same day, a coordinated press release 
accompanied by targeted information about IPD and 
vaccinations on THL’s website was issued in three 
languages, Finnish, Swedish and English. The ship-
yard communicated the information to employees by 
Figure 2
Confirmed and probable cases during an invasive 
pneumococcal disease outbreak at a shipyard by month 
of specimen collection and serotype, Turku, Southwest 
Finland, May–November 2019 (n = 37)





















Serotypes were not available for six probable cases (marked with a 
X) and six confirmed cases (four urine antigen positive-confirmed 
cases without blood culture and two culture-confirmed case).
Table
Characteristics of the interviewed cases in an invasive 
pneumococcal disease outbreak at a shipyard, Turku, 
Southwest Finland, May–November 2019 (n = 25)
Characteristic
Interviewed cases
















Occupation and tasks at the shipyard
Electrician 7 0
Plumber 3 0
Site supervisor 3 0
Ship builder 2 0
Other interior outfittersb 6 4
Work stage at the shipyard






Inorganic dust 18 4
Metal fumes 13 2
Solvents 11 3
Otherd 3 0




EU: European Union; EEA: European Economic Area.
a Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer or asthma.
b Included one welder/carpenter.
c More than one exposure per case was possible.
d Gases, acids or paint fumes.
Ten confirmed and two probable cases were not interviewed.
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Figure 3
Minimum spanning tree of isolates from cases connected to an invasive pneumococcal disease outbreak at a shipyard, 




































aMLST: accessory genome multilocus sequence typing; cgMLST: core genome multilocus sequence typing; IPD: invasive pneumococcal 
disease; ST: sequence type.
The date of sampling (day.month) is marked in the centre of each circle, representing an isolate from a confirmed case. Numbers on the 
branches represent allelic differences between the isolates from cgMLST and aMLST analysis. The number of total investigated targets was 
1,424; missing targets in any of the compared isolates were excluded from the analysis.
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circulating an information bulletin on the vaccine and 
IPD in three languages, Finnish, English and Russian, in 
areas accessible to all staff. Simultaneously, the ship-
yard management implemented hygiene measures and 
promoted the use of respiratory protective equipment 
for those exposed to metal fumes and inorganic dust.
Since 17 October, vaccination with pneumococcal poly-
saccharide vaccine (PPV23), covering all three detected 
serotypes, and seasonal influenza vaccine have been 
offered at the shipyard by the shipyard management 
and the local health authorities. The first target group 
for vaccination was ca 4,000 employees who worked 
on the final stage of ship outfitting. As at 7 November, 
4,004 workers had received PPV23. Prophylactic anti-
microbial treatment of the target group was considered 
by the OCT, but not implemented, as the potential ben-
efit in preventing further cases effectively and safely 
was uncertain after consulting external experts.
Discussion and conclusion
To our knowledge, only two similar IPD outbreaks at 
shipyards have been previously described: in Norway 
earlier in 2019 [2], and in Northern Ireland in 2015 [3,4]. 
Additionally, three IPD cases in workers at a shipyard 
were reported in Singapore in 2017 [7].
S. pneumoniae  is a Gram-positive bacterium that 
can colonise the upper respiratory tract and cause 
infections such as otitis media, pneumonia and IPD 
(bacteraemia and meningitis) [8]. Outbreaks of pneu-
mococcal disease occur relatively rarely, but have been 
described in crowded environments, such as care facil-
ities, garrisons and prisons [9]. Inadequate ventilation 
in such environments further increases the risk of IPD 
[10]. In addition to crowding, the level of pre-existing 
immunity against the infecting strain affects bacterial 
transmission. Extremes of age, specific underlying co-
morbidities, smoking, respiratory viral infections and 
immunosuppression are known risk factors for IPD [11-
13]. Exposure to metal fumes also increases the risk of 
IPD [14]. In the United Kingdom, it is suggested that vac-
cination should be considered for employees exposed 
to welding and metal fumes [15,16]. In Finland, legisla-
tion requires employers to offer vaccinations to protect 
their employees from occupational infectious diseases 
hazards. However, there are no specific guidelines on 
offering pneumococcal vaccine to occupational groups 
exposed to welding and metal fumes.
In Finland, it is mandatory to report IPD to the NIDR, and 
corresponding isolates are submitted to THL for species 
verification and serotyping. Since 2010, the childhood 
vaccination programme includes the 10-valent pneu-
mococcal conjugate vaccine. Pneumococcal conjugate 
or polysaccharide vaccine use in other age groups 
is low [17]. In 2018, 760 cases of IPD were reported 
nationwide (incidence 14/100,000 population), with 
5% of cases < 5 years of age and 52% ≥ 65 years of age. 
Higher incidence is reported among men than women 
(15 vs 12/100,000 population) [18].
In Turku, as in the Norwegian outbreak [2], both con-
firmed and probable cases were working in the final 
stage of ship building in the wet dock, and their work 
involved interior outfitting. Interviews with cases 
and discussions with shipyard management revealed 
that work in the wet dock required the largest work-
force compared with previous shipbuilding stages. 
Interviewees described that many parallel tasks involv-
ing exposure to inorganic dust and metal fumes are 
performed in close proximity. Some of those exposed 
were not using respiratory masks as these were not 
required for the main tasks. Workers emphasised that 
they spent extended working hours in either poorly 
ventilated or draughty conditions. Furthermore, most 
cases were heavy smokers (> 11 cigarettes/day, n = 13). 
In addition to the working conditions, the pneumococ-
cal serotypes identified in this outbreak are associated 
with a high attack rate [19] and for serotype 12F, a cycli-
cal epidemiologic pattern with outbreaks has been 
described [20]. We hypothesise that the risk of IPD at 
the shipyard is likely affected by many of the aforemen-
tioned factors, and exposure to different respiratory 
irritants may have facilitated infection. Extensive vac-
cination and hygiene measures are underway to con-
trol the outbreak. The risk of the shipyard tasks and 
working conditions will be assessed to identify other 
preventive strategies. Additionally, retrospective anal-
ysis of surveillance data from previous years, as well 
as further insights into virulence factors and molecular 
epidemiology, are warranted. Future studies may use 
other diagnostic criteria to resolve the magnitude of 
the outbreak.
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